Severe acute respiratory disease in American mink experimentally infected with SARS-CoV-2.

An animal model that fully recapitulates severe COVID-19 presentation in humans has been a top priority since the discovery of SARS-CoV-2 in 2019. Although multiple animal models are available for mild to moderate clinical disease, models that develop severe disease are still needed. Mink experimentally infected with SARS-CoV-2 developed severe acute respiratory disease, as evident by clinical respiratory disease, radiological, and histological changes. Virus was detected in nasal, oral, rectal, and fur swabs. Deep sequencing of SARS-CoV-2 from oral swabs and lung tissue samples showed repeated enrichment for a mutation in the gene encoding nonstructural protein 6 in open reading frame 1ab. Together, these data indicate that American mink develop clinical features characteristic of severe COVID-19 and, as such, are uniquely suited to test viral countermeasures.

An ACE2-dependent Sarbecovirus in Russian bats is resistant to SARS-CoV-2 vaccines.

Spillover of sarbecoviruses from animals to humans has resulted in outbreaks of severe acute respiratory syndrome SARS-CoVs and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Efforts to identify the origins of SARS-CoV-1 and -2 has resulted in the discovery of numerous animal sarbecoviruses-the majority of which are only distantly related to known human pathogens and do not infect human cells. The receptor binding domain (RBD) on sarbecoviruses engages receptor molecules on the host cell and mediates cell invasion. Here, we tested the receptor tropism and serological cross reactivity for RBDs from two sarbecoviruses found in Russian horseshoe bats. While these two viruses are in a viral lineage distinct from SARS-CoV-1 and -2, the RBD from one virus, Khosta 2, was capable of using human ACE2 to facilitate cell entry. Viral pseudotypes with a recombinant, SARS-CoV-2 spike encoding for the Khosta 2 RBD were resistant to both SARS-CoV-2 monoclonal antibodies and serum from individuals vaccinated for SARS-CoV-2. Our findings further demonstrate that sarbecoviruses circulating in wildlife outside of Asia also pose a threat to global health and ongoing vaccine campaigns against SARS-CoV-2.

Imported SARS-CoV-2 Variants of Concern Drove Spread of Infections across Kenya during the Second Year of the Pandemic

Using classical and genomic epidemiology, we tracked the COVID-19 pandemic in Kenya over 23 months to determine the impact of SARS-CoV-2 variants on its progression. SARS-CoV-2 surveillance and testing data were obtained from the Kenya Ministry of Health, collected daily from 306 health facilities. COVID-19-associated fatality data were also obtained from these health facilities and communities. Whole SARS-CoV-2 genome sequencing were carried out on 1241 specimens. Over the pandemic duration (March 2020–January 2022), Kenya experienced five waves characterized by attack rates (AR) of between 65.4 and 137.6 per 100,000 persons, and intra-wave case fatality ratios (CFR) averaging 3.5%, two-fold higher than the national average COVID-19 associated CFR. The first two waves that occurred before emergence of global variants of concerns (VoC) had lower AR (65.4 and 118.2 per 100,000). Waves 3, 4, and 5 that occurred during the second year were each dominated by multiple introductions each, of Alpha (74.9% genomes), Delta (98.7%), and Omicron (87.8%) VoCs, respectively. During this phase, government-imposed restrictions failed to alleviate pandemic progression, resulting in higher attack rates spread across the country. In conclusion, the emergence of Alpha, Delta, and Omicron variants was a turning point that resulted in widespread and higher SARS-CoV-2 infections across the country.

Three-Week Old Pigs Are Not Susceptible to Productive Infection with SARS-COV-2.

As the COVID-19 pandemic moves into its third year, there remains a need for additional animal models better recapitulating severe COVID to study SARS-CoV-2 pathogenesis and develop countermeasures, especially treatment options. Pigs are known intermediate hosts for many viruses with zoonotic potential and are susceptible to infection with alpha, beta and delta genera of coronaviruses. Herein, we infected young (3 weeks of age) pigs with SARS-CoV-2 using a combination of respiratory and parenteral inoculation routes. Pigs did not develop clinical disease, nor macroscopic or microscopic pathologic lesions upon SARS-CoV-2 infection. Despite occasional low levels of SARS-CoV-2 genomic RNA in the respiratory tract, subgenomic RNA and infectious virus were never found, and SARS-CoV-2-specific adaptive immune responses were not detectable over the 13-day study period. We concluded that pigs are not susceptible to productive SARS-CoV-2 infection and do not serve as a SARS-CoV-2 reservoir for zoonotic transmission.

Surface‒Aerosol Stability and Pathogenicity of Diverse Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus Strains, 2012‒2018.

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infects humans and dromedary camels and is responsible for an ongoing outbreak of severe respiratory illness in humans in the Middle East. Although some mutations found in camel-derived MERS-CoV strains have been characterized, most natural variation found across MERS-CoV isolates remains unstudied. We report on the environmental stability, replication kinetics, and pathogenicity of several diverse isolates of MERS-CoV, as well as isolates of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, to serve as a basis of comparison with other stability studies. Although most MERS-CoV isolates had similar stability and pathogenicity in our experiments, the camel-derived isolate C/KSA/13 had reduced surface stability, and another camel isolate, C/BF/15, had reduced pathogenicity in a small animal model. These results suggest that although betacoronaviruses might have similar environmental stability profiles, individual variation can influence this phenotype, underscoring the need for continual global viral surveillance.

The future of zoonotic risk prediction.

In the light of the urgency raised by the COVID-19 pandemic, global investment in wildlife virology is likely to increase, and new surveillance programmes will identify hundreds of novel viruses that might someday pose a threat to humans. To support the extensive task of laboratory characterization, scientists may increasingly rely on data-driven rubrics or machine learning models that learn from known zoonoses to identify which animal pathogens could someday pose a threat to global health. We synthesize the findings of an interdisciplinary workshop on zoonotic risk technologies to answer the following questions. What are the prerequisites, in terms of open data, equity and interdisciplinary collaboration, to the development and application of those tools? What effect could the technology have on global health? Who would control that technology, who would have access to it and who would benefit from it? Would it improve pandemic prevention? Could it create new challenges? This article is part of the theme issue 'Infectious disease macroecology: parasite diversity and dynamics across the globe'.

Case Study: Prolonged Infectious SARS-CoV-2 Shedding from an Asymptomatic Immunocompromised Individual with Cancer.

Long-term severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) shedding was observed from the upper respiratory tract of a female immunocompromised individual with chronic lymphocytic leukemia and acquired hypogammaglobulinemia. Shedding of infectious SARS-CoV-2 was observed up to 70 days, and of genomic and subgenomic RNA up to 105 days, after initial diagnosis. The infection was not cleared after the first treatment with convalescent plasma, suggesting a limited effect on SARS-CoV-2 in the upper respiratory tract of this individual. Several weeks after a second convalescent plasma transfusion, SARS-CoV-2 RNA was no longer detected. We observed marked within-host genomic evolution of SARS-CoV-2 with continuous turnover of dominant viral variants. However, replication kinetics in Vero E6 cells and primary human alveolar epithelial tissues were not affected. Our data indicate that certain immunocompromised individuals may shed infectious virus longer than previously recognized. Detection of subgenomic RNA is recommended in persistently SARS-CoV-2-positive individuals as a proxy for shedding of infectious virus.

Beyond Infection: Integrating Competence into Reservoir Host Prediction.

Most efforts to predict novel reservoirs of zoonotic pathogens use information about host exposure and infection rather than competence, defined as the ability to transmit pathogens. Better obtaining and integrating competence data into statistical models as covariates, as the response variable, and through postmodel validation should improve predictive research.

Bat-borne virus diversity, spillover and emergence.

Most viral pathogens in humans have animal origins and arose through cross-species transmission. Over the past 50 years, several viruses, including Ebola virus, Marburg virus, Nipah virus, Hendra virus, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV), Middle East respiratory coronavirus (MERS-CoV) and SARS-CoV-2, have been linked back to various bat species. Despite decades of research into bats and the pathogens they carry, the fields of bat virus ecology and molecular biology are still nascent, with many questions largely unexplored, thus hindering our ability to anticipate and prepare for the next viral outbreak. In this Review, we discuss the latest advancements and understanding of bat-borne viruses, reflecting on current knowledge gaps and outlining the potential routes for future research as well as for outbreak response and prevention efforts.

Effect of Environmental Conditions on SARS-CoV-2 Stability in Human Nasal Mucus and Sputum.

We found that environmental conditions affect the stability of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 in nasal mucus and sputum. The virus is more stable at low-temperature and low-humidity conditions, whereas warmer temperature and higher humidity shortened half-life. Although infectious virus was undetectable after 48 hours, viral RNA remained detectable for 7 days.

Effectiveness of N95 Respirator Decontamination and Reuse against SARS-CoV-2 Virus.

The coronavirus pandemic has created worldwide shortages of N95 respirators. We analyzed 4 decontamination methods for effectiveness in deactivating severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 virus and effect on respirator function. Our results indicate that N95 respirators can be decontaminated and reused, but the integrity of respirator fit and seal must be maintained.